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Inadequacies in Civil Rights Law: The Need for Sexual
Harassment Legislation
I. INTRODUCTION
Demands of sexual consessions in exchange for job benefits have long been a
common abuse of personal power at the office. ' Likewise, the surreptitious squeeze
on the factory floor, the clandestine kiss in the copyroom, the lewd remark, and the
obscene suggestion have been standard procedure at many places of employment. 2
Not only did the victim of such attacks have no legal recourse, but she3 frequently
was led to believe that the behavior she found offensive was normal and should be
taken in stride. 4 Sexual harassment was not even considered to be a legal issue until
the last decade.
In June of 1986, the United States Supreme Court first addressed the issue of
on-the-job sexual harassment 5 with the case of Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson.6
Instead of clarifying the developing sexual harassment law, the Meritor decision
raised as many questions as it answered, and left the lower courts to wade through a
swamp of ambiguities. 7 Since its early evolution in the 1970s, sexual harassment law
has become and continues to be a legal morass; lower court discrepancies in
interpretation of the law since Meritor serve as evidence of this fact. 8 It is now clear
that courts need federal legislative guidance to move confidently and uniformly in this
new and rapidly growing area of law. But confusion in the judiciary is slight
1. C. MACKYNNON, SEM'UAL HARS.%MENr or WoRKro Wo EN 32-40 (1979).
2. Id. at 40-47.
3. While the author recognizes that males in the workplace may be sexually harassed by female or male
supervisors, and that female employees may be sexually harassed by female supervisors, this Comment will use the
feminine case to refer to the sexually harassed employee and the masculine case to refer to the harassing supervisor. Such
grammatical structure reflects the vast majority of sexual harassment cases that reach the courts.
Also, when this Comment mentions sexual harassment in the workplace, it is referring to the harassing acts of a
supervisory employee toward a nonsupervisory employee. The scope of the term is thus restricted to keep a pure focus
on relevant arguments and avoid sidestepping into questions of peer-employee harassment and customer or client
harassment.
4. C. MAcKi-,oN', supra note 1, at 27-28.
5. "Sexual harassment," as it will be used in this Comment, consists of two distinct types of activity. The first
is "quid pro quo" sexual harassment in which tangible employment benefits or detriments are conditioned upon
submission to a superior's sexual advances, and the second is "hostile environment" sexual harassment, where a
supervisor creates or allows to be created a discriminatory work environment. See infra notes 125-39 and accompanying
text. Each of these definitions encompasses elements of attempted sexual imposition as well as traditional discriminatory
activity. These exclusively sexual elements add a dimension to sexual harassment that makes it a different type of problem
than racial, religious, or ethnic harassment. See infra notes 14-24 and accompanying text.
6. 106 S. Ct. 2399 (1986).
7. Of the three major questions that confronted the Court in Meritor (Does Title VII provide a cause of action for
"hostile environment" sexual harassment? Did the district court err in admitting certain testimony relating to the
plaintiff's sexually-oriented behavior? Under what standard of liability should the employer be held in sexual harassment
cases? See id, at 2409.), the majority left distinct ambiguities pertaining to the answers to two questions. The majority
opinion in Meritor left pressing questions as to the extent of employer liability, one of the most important aspects of sexual
harassment litigation. Id. at 2408-09. Also, while the majority addressed procedural problems of evidence which arise
when deciding whether the sexually-oriented action was "unwelcome," they did not issue a comprehensive statement on
the subject. Id. at 2406-07.
8. See Volk v. Coler, 638 F. Supp. 1555 (C.D. I11. 1986); Bowen v. Valley Camp of Utah, Inc., 639 F. Supp.
1199 (D. Utah 1986); Bohen v. City of E. Chicago, 799 F.2d 1180 (7th Cir. 1986); Jones v. Flagship Int'l, 793 F.2d 714
(5th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 952 (1987).
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compared to the confusion suffered by those most directly affected by sexual
harassment regulation: employers, managers, and workers. Employers need the same
guidance to determine how to behave in relation to a new legal liability and to
understand what acts are actionable, against whom, and under what law.
While Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19649 (the "Act") is often perceived
as the basis for current sexual harassment law, Congress has never directly addressed
the issue of sexual harassment.' 0 Administrative and judicial actions have implied
into the Act an intent to regulate sexual harassment.' l However, Title VII's sparse
legislative history shows absolutely no attempt to address the sexual harassment
issues that courts and agencies are currently regulating under the Act.' 2
This Comment calls for congressional action for the prohibition and regulation
of sexually harassing conduct in the workplace. Section II will show that federal
legislative action is needed for at least three reasons. First, on-the-job sexual
harassment is an important social issue that is rapidly becoming an important legal
issue. Second, the decision makers who are currently handling the issue are not
equipped to handle it properly. Finally, the United States Congress, the one legal
body best equipped to address the problem, has not yet explicitly addressed it. The
remainder of the Comment will discuss what type of action Congress should take.
New legislation, whether passed as an amendment to existing legislation or as a new
law, should provide a cause of action for both currently-recognized forms of sexual
harassment, quid pro quo sex discrimination and harassment through creation of a
hostile work environment.' 3 It should also assign liability for both the harassing
employee and the employer.
II. CONGRESS SHOULD REGULATE EMPLOYMENT-RELATED SEXUAL HARASSMENT
A. Work-Related Sexual Harassment: An Important Social and Legal Issue
Sexual harassment is a complex and difficult social problem that has become
an increasingly troublesome legal problem. Lawmakers need to regulate it, but they
need to do so carefully. As harassment claims increase, courts and agencies, as well
as employers and workers, will realize the need for logical, cohesive, and authori-
tative rules addressing the problem. Sexual harassment is an important issue that must
be addressed by Congress because: it is demeaning conduct that deserves censure; the
complexity of the issues necessitates a well-reasoned solution; and sexual harassment
continues to grow in social and legal importance.
9. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e - 2000e-17 (1982).
10. See infra section I (C).
11. Id.
12. See infra notes 112-24 and accompanying text.
13. See supra note 5.
[Vol. 48:11491152
19871 THE NEED FOR SEXUAL HARASSMENT LEGISLATION 1153
1. Sexual Harassment Is Demeaning Treatment Deserving of Censure
In the nineteenth century, legislators and courts decided that work-related
discrimination based on race, religion, or ethnicity was inconsistent with the
fundamental principles of America's system of government.' 4 Only recently have
legislators declared that "discrimination against women is no less serious than other
forms of prohibited employment practices and is to be accorded the same degree of
social concern given to any type of unlawful discrimination." 15 Employment-based
sexual harassment is just as dehumanizing as other forms of discrimination; it changes
the focus in an employment relationship from the merits and work performance of an
employee to the sexuality of that employee.' 6 In addition, sexual harassment
degrades women by reinforcing their traditionally inferior role in the workforce. t7
14. See, e.g., Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (national origin); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S.
303 (1879) (race).
15. H.R. Rn'. No. 238, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 5, reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE Coo. & A.usn. NEws 2137, 2141.
16. By confusing a woman's sex role with her role in the workplace, a harassing supervisor evaluates women
employees with an entirely different set of criteria than he would other employees. In this "sex role spillover," women
are perceived more for their sexual attributes than their employment attributes, creating a skewed and unfair standard of
job evaluation. The spillover attitude is epecially strong where a women takes a traditionally "man'sjob." B. GurK, SEx
'AN TuE VoRKPLACE 129-52 (1985). See also L. FAu.EY, SEXUAL SHnAnKowN: THE SEXUAL Hrxsss.mr or VoMEN ON -ME JOB
28-51 (1978).
However, many social scientists feel that sexual harassment is not driven by social or courting impulses as much as
it is driven by the desire to assert power over a person in a vulnerable position. They believe that supervisors use their
position of power to prove dominance over others, thus inflating their self-image. This "power dominance theory" of
sexual harassment is well supported. See Renick, Sexual Harassment at Work: Why It Happens, What to Do About It, 59
PE.so',NNEL J. 659, 662 (1980); Maypole & Skaine, Sexual Harassment of Blue Collar Workers, 9 J. Soc. & Soc. WEL
682, 686, 694 (1982); Tangri, Burt, & Johnson, Sexual Harassment at Work: Three Explanatory Models, J. Soc. IssuEs
38, 55-74 (1982). For example, the more vulnerable a person is, the more prone she is to be harassed. The federal
government's Merit Protection Board Survey of federal workers noted that women are more likely to be harassed by
supervisors than are men, and that younger women and single or divorced women are most likely to be harassed. U.S.
Mer SYsrsIs PeoEcnox BO., OFFICE OF MERIr Sysrmis Review ND STUDIES, SEXUA.L HARAss.ENr IN THE FEDERAL vopLacii-
Is IrA PROBLai? 33-36, 43 (1981) [hereinafter MERTr SYsmsIs SURVY].
Also supporting the power dominance theory are statistics showing that women who seem to be more of a threat to
men, usually by higher education or entry into a traditional male occupation, are more likely to be harassed than
women in a traditional female occupation. In theory, some men feel threatened by women who invade traditionally male
territory, such as construction jobs or the legal profession. These men sexually harass women to reassert the male
dominance they feel they are losing when women enter these job markets, and to compensate for their discomfort with
a society which allows women in roles that "belong to men." Illustrating this fact, 53% of female federal employees in
nontraditional jobs reported being sexually harassed as compared to 41% in traditional jobs. Metrr Sysmss SUevev at 44,
50-51. Statistics also show that the highest incidences of sexual harassment were reported by women with some graduate
school education (53%), women with college degrees (50%), and women with graduate or professional degrees (48%).
Mer Sysss Su %vT at 44-45. The Merit Systems Protection Board suggests that because "men see women entering
their 'territory' as a threat, imeni respond by using sexual harassment to try to limit the women's success or to get them
to leave." Metrr Ssr mis SuRvEv at 50-51.
For a brief, yet complete discussion of the harmful effects of sexual harassment, see Schoenheider, A Theory of Tort
Liability for Sexual Harassment in the Workplace, 134 U. PA. L. REv. 1461, 1464-67 (1986). For a thorough discussion
of motivating factors and statistical results involved in sexual harassment, see Brief for Women's Bar Association of
Massachusetts, Minnesota Women Lawyers, Inc., Women Lawyers Association of Michigan, Colorado Women's Bar
Association as Amici Curiae at 4-13, Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 106 S. Ct. 2399 (1986) (No. 84-1979).
17. Catherine MacKinnon illustrates this when she writes:
Sexual harassment at work critically undercuts women's potential for work equality as a means to social
equality. . . . A job, no matter how menial, offers the potential for independence from the nuclear family,
which makes women dependent upon men for life necessities .... Sexual harassment on the job undercuts a
woman's autonomy outside the home by sexualizing her role in exactly the same way as within the family:
sexual imposition combined with a definition of her work in terms of tasks which serve the man....
C. MAcKtosN, supra note 1, at 216-17. In addition, "sexual harassment serves to remind both the employee and the
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2. The Complexity of Sexual Harassment Issues Necessitates
Well-Reasoned Solutions
Sexual harassment is harmful, but it must be regulated with great care. In the
general sense, all discrimination prohibitions are opposed to the fundamental
majoritarian notions of nonintervention that pervade the American legal system.' 8
"Discrimination law is an exception to the legal system's basic unwillingness to
intervene in those processes of social selection which systematically produce
variances in social outcomes .... "9 More specifically, sexual harassment presents
problems that do not occur with other forms of discrimination. 20 While sexual
harassment is harmful in many of the same ways in which racial, religious, or ethnic
discrimination is harmful, sexually-oriented speech includes an added dimension of
legitimate traditional courtship activity2 which makes it more difficult to regulate
than speech focusing on race, religion, or ethnicity. 22 As counsel for the United
States and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) notes in their
brief as Amici Curiae to the Supreme Court in the Meritor case: "Sexual attraction
is a fact of life, and it may often play a role in the day-to-day social exchange between
employees in the workplace. ' 23
In many cases, behavior reflecting a natural sexual attraction in daily social
exchange is socially acceptable and therefore counterbalances the reasons to regulate
sexually-oriented speech or acts. 24 In other words, since no legitimate reason exists
employer, that as a woman she is still seen as a sexual object rather than a contributing worker." Taub, Keeping Women
in Their Place: Stereotyping Per Se as a Form of Employment Discrimination, 21 B.C.L. REv. 345, 418 (1980).
18. See U.S. v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) ("There may be a narrower scope for
operation of the presumption of constitutionality when legislation appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition
of the Constituton, such as those of the first ten amendments, which are deemed equally specific when held to be embraced
within the Fourteenth. See Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369-70; Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 452.").
19. C. MAcKINNoN, supra note 1, at 106.
20. As Judge George MacKinnon observed in his well-reasoned concurrence to Barnes v. Costle:
Sexual advances may not be intrinsically offensive, and no policy can be derived from the equal
employment opportunity laws to discourage them. We are not here concerned with racial epithets or confusing
union authorization cards, which serve no one's interest, but with social patterns that to some extent are normal
and expectable. It is the abuse of the practice, rather than the practice itself, that arouses alarm.
561 F.2d 983, 1001 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (MacKinnon, J., concurring). Even Joan Vermeulen, the Legal Director for the
National Sexual Harassment Legal Back-Up Center of the Working Women's Institute and a leading advocate of strict
prohibitions on sexual harassment, recognizes a "valid concern" that "sexual advances, if not actually flattering and
appreciated, are at least not intrinsically offensive.... " Vermeulen, Employer Liability Under Title VII for Sexual
Harassment by Supervisory Employees, 10 CAP. U.L. REv. 499, 529 (1981).
21. In this Comment, "traditional courtship activity" refers to speech or acts based on attraction between two
people of the opposite sex. This can be premarital courtship or engagement in any legitimate public form, including dating
or speech and activities associated with dating.
22. Not only is sexual harassment the most difficult form of harassment to regulate, but it is also the most difficult
to prove. Because of the courtship/sexual-attraction aspect, much sexual harassment occurs when the employee is alone
with the supervisor; thus, in many cases, no witnesses can verify the harassing words or actions and the employee is left
with her word against that of her supervisor. Contrast with traditional racial, religious, or ethnic harassment in which
public humiliation is often a goal of the harasser and witnesses to harassment are usually plentiful.
23. Brief for the United States and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission as Amici Curiae at 13, Meritor
Say. Bank v. Vinson, 106 S. Ct. 2399 (1986) (No. 84-1979).
24. "[Clonduct that any reasonable person would readily regard as offensive harassment if unwelcome will lose
that character entirely if directed toward another person in a consensual relationship in which it is welcomed .... [A]
subtle breakdown of, or alteration in that relationship may transform conduct that was originally not a Title VII offense,
because then 'welcomed,' into an actionable wrong." Brief of Trustees of Boston University as Amicus Curiae at 9-10,
Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 106 S. Ct. 2399 (1986) (No. 84-1979). Furthermore, the fact that only sexual harassment
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to make racially-oriented comments, the government can regulate these comments
with a broad sweep. However, since there may be legitimate reasons to make
sexually-oriented comments, regulation of those comments must be made with care
not to stifle legitimate remarks while outlawing illegitimate ones.
a. The Right to Traditional Courtship Activity
Sexually-oriented speech or activity can be considered legitimate if it is not
coercive, is not offensive, and is part of the customary and normal courtship
process.25 Not only is this speech or activity legitimate, but it is probably
constitutionally protected under certain court-implied rights. The Supreme Court
recognizes a right to privacy of social association2 6 and a more restricted, less clearly
defined right to personal sexual choice. 27 These rights imply the existence of at least
a limited right to sexual association.
A right to traditional premarriage courtship activity can be implied from
Supreme Court interpretations of associational freedoms. The Court has recognized
the existence of constitutionally protected forms of private and nonpolitical, social
association. 28 Marriage has been the Court's example of such an association. 29 In
several cases, the Court recognized that marriage involves interests of basic
importance to society, 30 in effect recognizing a right to marry. Justice Douglas
described marriage as one of the "basic civil rights of man. Marriage and procreation
are fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race." 3' Co-existent with
the right to marry, the Court has defined a right to choose a marriage partner, 32
thereby implying a right to sexually-based association. If an individual has a right to
marry and a right to choose a spouse, then that individual must be permitted the
practical actions that comprise "choosing" a spouse. 33 Therefore, the Court would
probably construe a right to association designed to lead to marriage. If the right to
has quid pro quo and environmental distinctions is evidence of the difference between sexual harassment and religious,
racial, or ethnic harassment.
25. See infra text accompanying notes 28-44.
26. See infra notes 28-41 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 42-44 and accompanying text.
28. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. 2841, reh'g denied, 107 S. Ct. 29 (1986) (reconfirms a right to marriage);
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (protected the right to associate in forming a marriage); NAACP v. Button,
371 U.S. 415 (1963) (protected forms of association that are not political, but are exclusively for social benefit); NAACP
v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (protected freedom to associate and privacy in one's associations, found in the
penumbra of the first amendment).
29. "Ve deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights .... Marriage is a coming together for better
or for worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate to the degree of being sacred." Griswold v Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,
486 (1965).
30. Bowers v. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. 2841, reh'g denied, 107 S. Ct. 29 (1986); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S.
371 (1971); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262
U.S. 390 (1923).
31. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
32. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
33. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (Certain liberties fundamental to the right of privacy
in marriage are protected by that right.).
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marry and the right to social association are constitutionally protected, then the
traditional premarriage courtship process should also be protected. 34
In fact, the Court in recent decisions has held that the Bill of Rights affords "the
formation and preservation of certain kinds of highly personal relationships a
substantial measure of sanctuary from unjustified interference by the State.'' 35 The
Court in Roberts v. United States Jaycees 36 noted that only relationships with certain
qualities-'"relative smallness, a high degree of selectivity in decisions to begin and
maintain the affiliation, and seclusion from others in critical aspects of the
relationship" 37-are likely to reflect "the considerations that have led to an
understanding of freedom of association as an intrinsic element of personal
liberty."- 38 In a May 1987 decision, Board of Directors of Rotary International v.
Rotary Club of Duarte,39 the Court reaffirmed the associational protections defined in
RobertsA0 The majority in Rotary stated,
[W]e have not held that constitutional protection is restricted to relationships among family
members. We have emphasized that the first amendment protects those relationships,
including family relationships, that presuppose "deep attachments and commitments to the
necessarily few other individuals with whom one shares not only a special community of
thoughts, experiences, and beliefs but also distinctively personal aspects of one's life."
Roberts v. United States Jaycees, [468 U.S.] at 619-20. 41
A traditional premarriage courtship relationship could fall within the associational
protection defined in the Roberts and Rotary decisions. Such a relationship is small,
intimate, selective, and excludes others from critical aspects of the relationship.
Aside from associational protections, a right to traditional courtship activity can
also be implied from Supreme Court decisions concerning privacy of certain types of
sexual choice. Justice Blackmun noted that a right of privacy extends to activities
relating to marriage, procreation, and family relationships. 42 Justice Brennan
observed that if the court-fashioned constitutional right to privacy means anything,
34. This right probably only applies in heterosexual relationships. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. 2841, reh'g
denied, 107 S. Ct. 29 (1986).
35. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618 (1984) (citing, e.g., Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S.
510, 534-35 (1925) and Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923)). The Court then roughly defined the types of
personal relationships which it found to be constitutionally protected:
Without precisely identifying every consideration that may underlie this type of constitutional protection, we
have noted that certain kinds of personal bonds have played a critical role in the culture and traditions of the
Nation by cultivating and transmitting shared ideals and beliefs; they thereby foster diversity and act as critical
buffers between the individual and the power of the State. Moreover, the constitutional shelter afforded such
relationships reflects the realization that individuals draw much of their emotional enrichment from others.
Protecting these relationships from unwarranted state interference therefore safeguards the ability independently
to define one's identity that is central to any concept of liberty.
Id. at 618, 619 (citations omitted).
36. 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
37. Id. at 620. The Court noted that "factors that may be relevant include size, purpose, policies, selectivity,
congeniality, and other characteristics that in a particular case may be pertinent."
38. Id.
39. 107 S. Ct. 1940 (1987).
40. "The Court has recognized that the freedom to enter into and carry on certain intimate or private relationships
is a fundamental element of liberty protected by the Bill of Rights. Such relationships may take various forms, including
the most intimate." Id. at 1945.
41. Id. at 1946.
42. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 129, reh'g denied, 410 U.S. 959 (1973).
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"it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted
governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as whether
to bear or beget a child." '43 Despite recent limitations on the doctrine, the
constitutional right to privacy seems to include some forms of sexually-based
association. 44 Under either the right to association or the right to privacy, traditional
courtship activities are probably protected by the Constitution. Even if they are not
specifically protected, marriage, courtship, and privacy are still within the sphere of
constitutional interests. 45 These courtship activities weigh against the negative
aspects of sexual harassment, making sexual harassment much more difficult to
regulate than other forms of discrimination. 46
b. The Difficulty of Differentiating Between Consenting Relationship and
Harassment
The problems of regulating sexually-oriented behavior in the workplace are
magnified by the fact that this behavior can be abused to gain advantage for either of
the involved parties. On one side, a supervisor can abuse his position of power to
force sexual submission from a nonsupervisory employee. 47 This traditional sexual
harassment is thought to be common in the workplace and, unless the actions are
blatant, 48 is very difficult to prove.49 On the other side, a nonsupervisory employee
can use charges of sexual harassment to extract revenge from a company or a
supervisor with whom she is not satisfied, or even use sex as a weapon for
advancement, knowing that if her plan fails, she can always claim sexual harass-
ment.50 In either case, defining the line between a legitimate, consenting relationship
and sexual harassment lies in the often subtle attitudes, intentions, and actions of the
43. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972).
44. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. 2841, reh'g denied, 107 S. Ct. 29 (1986) (right to marriage); Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (right to termination of pregnancy in some cases); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972)
(right to contraception for unmarried persons); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (right to contraception for
married persons).
45. See supra notes 28-44 and accompanying text.
46. An important problem arises when courts apply employer liability in hostile environment harassment cases
because supervisor sexual harassment is usually not sanctioned by the employer. When a supervisor makes sexually-
oriented comments to an employee, whether those comments are taken to be complimentary or derogatory, he is obviously
not acting within the scope of his employment.
Recent court decisions, including Meritor, have applied agency principles in finding employers liable for the
harassing acts of their supervisors. "[W]e do agree with the EEOC that Congress wanted courts to look to agency
principles for guidance in this area." 106 S. Ct. 2399, 2408 (1986). But, according to classic agency principles, an
employee is not defined as an agent when performing an act outside the scope of employment. P. KEEroN, PRossER AND
KEvToN ON ToRxs § 70 (5th ed. 1984); R.s-rsArsr (SEcoND) OF AGECY § 219(1) (1958); see Ferguson v. E. I. du Pont de
Nemours and Co., 560 F. Supp. 1172, 1196-99 (D. Del. 1983); see also REsrATiENT (SeCOND) OF AGENCY § 165 comment
(c) (1958) ("If [a party] knows that the agent is acting for the benefit of himself or a third person, the transaction is
suspicious upon its face, and the principal is not bound unless the agent is authorized."). Thus, under agency principles,
most cases of hostile environment sexual harassment, especially those dealing with personal physical attraction, should
not be imputed to the employer.
However, while the logic used by courts to justify employer liability may be flawed, the best possible policy result
is attained through the rule. See infra section 11 (B).
47. C. MAcKiNNo.N, supra note 1, at 32-47.
48. Id. at 26-30.
49. See supra note 22.
50. See, e.g., Smith, Yes, The Ambitious Office "Femme Fatale" Can Indeed "Hare It All", L.A. Daily J., Aug.
29, 1985, at 4, col. 3.
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involved parties. "Whereas racial slurs are intrinsically offensive and presumptively
unwelcome, sexual advances and innuendo are ambiguous: depending on their
context, they may be intended by the initiator, and perceived by the recipient, as
denigrating or complimentary, as threatening or welcome, as malevolent or innocu-
ous." 51
In addition, courts and commentators have wrestled with ambiguities in defining
the word "sex" for the purposes of proving sex discrimination.52 Sex has several
distinct denotations, 53 and many courts have been willing to interpret Title VII
proscriptions to include relationship-based discrimination, 54" while many others have
refused to extend them beyond gender-based discrimination. 55 When the Eighth
Circuit tried to limit the Title VII definition of sex to its "plain meaning" and
"traditional definition," they did not reconcile the multiple meanings of the word as
it can apply in modem sex discrimination cases. 56
The sexual harassment discussion in DeCintio v. Westchester County Medical
Center57 best exemplifies this problem. In DeCintio, the Second Circuit found that
Title VII does not provide a cause of action for a male therapist who was denied
promotion because the department administrator promoted a female therapist with
whom he was romantically involved. 58 While acknowledging that romantic favorit-
ism in job promotion is an unfair practice, the unanimous court declared that holding
it to be a Title VII sex discrimination violation "would involve the EEOC and federal
51. Brief for the United States and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission as Amici Curiae at 13, Meritor
Say. Bank v. Vinson, 106 S. Ct. 2399 (1986) (No. 84-1979).
52. See infra notes 53-54.
53. The most relevant denotations of the word "sex" for this discussion are: the one describing gender, "one of
the two divisions of organic [beings], especially human beings, respectively designated male or female," and the one
describing physical attraction, "the sphere of interpersonal behavior especially between male and female most directly
associated with, leading up to, substituting for or resulting from genital union" and "the phenomena of sexual instincts
and their manifestations." WEs-r's Tnrso NEw INTERaNAoNAL DicnoR Y 2081 (1986).
54. See Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977). The Barnes court found sexual advances to be legally
linked to the gender of the plaintiff, thus melding the two most important distinct denotations of the word "sex" (see
supra note 53). The court held that the plaintiff "became the target of her superior's sexual desires because she was a
woman .. " Id. at 990. While this semantic device has been convenient in allowing sexual harassment cases to fall
within the reach of Title VII, it artificially combines relationship-oriented discrimination and gender-oriented discrimi-
nation under the deceptively broad title of sex discrimination.
The Barnes court recognized the logical discrepancies created by their definition when they observed that, because
of their approach to the problem, a plaintiff who was sexually harassed by a heterosexual or homosexual supervisor has
a cause of action under Title VII, while a plaintiff who was sexually harassed by a bisexual supervisor does not have the
same cause of action. Id. at 990 n.55. The law against sexually-abusive conduct at the workplace should provide relief
based on findings about the conduct itself and not on the expansiveness of the supervisor's taste in victims. Using the
Barnes rationale, a defendant in a sexual harassment suit could effectively rebut a prima facie case against him by
asserting his bisexuality which, if proven, would qualify his harassment as nondiscriminatory for Title VII purposes.
Most courts trying sexual harassment actions under Title VII since 1977 have used the Barnes logic to find
relationship-oriented sex discrimination actionable. See, e.g., Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 106 S. Ct. 2399 (1986);
Miller v. Bank of Am., 600 F.2d 211 (9th Cir. 1979).
55. See, e.g., DeCintio v. Westchester County Medical Center, 807 F.2d 304 (2d Cir. 1986), petition for cert.
filed, June 1987 (voluntary, romantic relationship); Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, 742 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 471 U.S. 1017 (1985) (transexuality); Sommers v. Budget Mktg., Inc., 667 F.2d 748 (8th Cir. 1982)
(transexuality); DeSantis v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 608 F.2d 327 (9th Cir. 1979) (homosexuality); Smith v. Liberty Mut.
Ins. Co., 569 F.2d 325 (5th Cir. 1978) (effeminancy).
56. See Sommers v. Budget Mktg., Inc., 667 F.2d 748, 749-50 (8th Cir. 1982).
57. 807 F.2d 304 (2d Cir. 1986). See also Yatvin v. Madison Metro. School Dist., 653 F. Supp. 945 (W.D. Wis.
1987).
58. 807 F.2d 304, 308 (2d Cir. 1986).
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courts in the policing of intimate relationships. Such a course, founded on a distortion
of the meaning of the word 'sex' in the context of Title VII, is both impracticable and
unwarranted. '59 The court further observed that the term "sex" was misapplied in
this suit because female therapists who were not romantically involved with the
program administrator would also be denied promotion. 60 The complexity and
ambiguity of these issues accentuate the need for a well-considered, well-devised
policy toward defining and deterring on-the-job sexual harassment.
3. The Issue of Sexual Harassment Is Growing in Social and Legal Importance
Sexual harassment of working women6 t is a widespread practice. Of 9000
women who voluntarily responded to one of the first work-related sexual harassment
surveys, nine out of ten reported experiences of sexual harassment. 62 The most
statistically reliable studies on sexual harassment show that half of all working
women have been sexually harassed. 63 The magnitude of sexual harassment as a
social problem becomes obvious when one considers that over forty-eight million
women were part of the American workforce in 1986. 64
Furthermore, the growing need for legislation on sexual harassment is evidenced
by the explosion of claims in the past six years. 65 In November of 1980, the EEOC
published guidelines 66 which focused the attention of America's legal community on
sexual harassment. In the years before the release of the guidelines, the EEOC received
an estimated 1000 sexual harassment claims per year.67 Within the first year after
release of the guidelines, 3453 sexual harassment complaints were filed with the
agency. 68 Each year has brought an increase of sexual harassment claims. 69 Daniel
Leach, former EEOC vice-chairman, estimated that twice as many cases were pending
59. Id. The court found "no justification for defining 'sex,' for Title VII purposes, so broadly as to include an
ongoing, voluntary, romantic engagement." Id. at 307.
60. Id. at 308. The court decided:
Appellees were not prejudiced because of their status as males; rather, they were discriminated against because
[the program administrator] preferred his paramour. Appellees faced exactly the same predicament as that faced
by any woman applicant for promotion: No one but [his paramour] could be considered for the appointment
because of [her] special relationship to [the administrator].
Id.
61. While this Comment is concerned with sexual harassment of working men as well as women (see supra note
3), statistical surveys contained in this section refer only to the harassment of women.
62. Safran, What Men Do To Women on the Job: A Shocking Look at Sexual Harassment, R5DBooK, Nov. 1976,
at 149. Redbook published a questionnaire titled "How do you handle sex on the job?"; they received over 9000
responses. See C. MAcKN. m-4, supra note 1, at 247 n.l.
63. See B. GurrK, Srx AD THE VosPxrAcE 46 (1985) (53% of respondents had experienced sexual harassment);
MIErr Sysrsais SuRvy, supra note 16, at 33-36 (42% of women federal employees had been sexually harassed on thejob);
Rossein, Sex Discrimination and the Sexually Charged Work Environment, 9 N.Y.U. REv. OF LAW AND Soc. CHNGE
271-305 (1979-80) (It is safe to estimate that between 42% and 88% of the female workforce has at some point been
subjected to sexual harassment.).
64. BtRAu OF LABOR STAnitics, women in the workforce, March 1986, reprinted in THE WVo~w.n A.ANAC AND BOOK
Or FAcTs: 1987 128 (1986).
65. Infra note 71.
66. EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R § 1604.11 (1986).
67. Low, Victims Win Large Awards in Sexual Harassment Cases, L.A. Daily J., July 26, 1982, at 1, col.6.
68. Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA), News and Background Information (Part 11), at 6, July 20, 1981.
69. Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA), News and Background Information (Part 11), Interview with Daniel Leach, at 8-10,
July 20, 1981.
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before various state and local equal opportunity agencies at the same time. 70 Leach
also commented that these figures did not accurately reflect the sexual harassment
situation because "nine out of 10 cases are settled before they ever get to court," and
because many women would rather quit their jobs or suffer silently rather than face
the embarrassment and stigma of filing a charge. 7t Sexual harassment is not going to
disappear, and as the issue becomes less taboo more claims will fill courts and
agencies .72
B. Work-Related Sexual Harassment Should Be Regulated by Congress
Congress is the best decision-making body for regulating work-related sexual
harassment. Unfortunately, the decision makers who are currently addressing the
sexual harassment problem in the United States are not the best groups to be doing
so. For a variety of reasons, the federal judiciary, administrative agencies, and state
courts and legislatures are not properly equipped to handle the issue.
1. The Judiciary Should Not Be Creating Sexual Harassment Law
Most of the current sexual harassment law has developed through judicial
decisions. The Supreme Court initially used its interpretive powers to expand the
scope of Title VII's work harassment and sex discrimination provisions. 73 Some
lower courts soon followed, opening new doors to plaintiffs in prospective sexual
harassment actions. 74
Throughout the judicial evolution of sexual harassment regulation, federal courts
have created law where none previously existed. The 1977 decisions of Barnes v.
70. Id. at 9.
71. Id. According to the EEOC's 16th, 17th and 18th annual reports, in 1931, the agency received 3453 sexual
harassment claims, EEOC, 16m AsNuAL RPoRT 141 (1981); in 1982, it received 4195 claims, EEOC, 17mT A'uA RsorT
54 (1982); and in 1983, 4468 claims, EEOC, 18TH AsNsuA RPORT 58 (1983).
72. See C. MAcKNNON, supra note 1, at 1-3.
73. "[Title VI prohibits] all practices in whatever form which create inequality in employment opportunity due to
discrimination on the basis of race, religion, sex, or national origin .... Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747,
763 (1976) (citing Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 44 (1973); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411
U.S. 792, 800 (1973); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-30 (1971)). "[In] forbidding employers to
discriminate against individuals because of their sex, Congress intended to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate
treatment of men and women resulting from sex stereotypes." Los Angeles Dep't of Water v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702,
707 n.13 (1978), vacated on other grounds, 461 U.S. 951 (1983).
74. Basing his arguments on Griggs v. Duke Power Co., Judge Goldberg of the Fifth Circuit wrote that "-o]ne can
readily envision working environments so heavily polluted with discrimination as to destroy completely the emotional and
psychological stability of minority group workers, and I think Section 703 of Title VII was aimed at the eradication of
such noxious practices." Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 957 (1972). See
Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 903-05 (11th Cir. 1982) (sexually demeaning work environment constitutes
grounds for a cause of action under Title VII); Taylor v. Jones, 653 F.2d 1193, 1199 (8th Cir. 1981) (racially
discriminatory work environment clearly violates Title VII); Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 944-45 (D.C. Cir. 1981)
(Title VII "conditions of employment" can include psychological and emotional work environment); Carroll v. Talman
Fed. Say. and Loan Ass'n, 604 F.2d 1028, 1032 n. 13 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 929 (1980) (suggestive dress
policy for women considered a Title VII violation); Waters v. Heublein, Inc., 547 F.2d 466 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
433 U.S. 915 (1977) (white plaintiff can sue employer who discriminates against blacks, because she has a right to a
prejudice-free environment); Gray v. Greyhound Lines, East, 545 F.2d 169, 176 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (pattern of derogatory
racial remarks violates Title VII).
1160
19871 THE NEED FOR SEXUAL HARASSMENT LEGISLATION
Costle75 and Tompkins v. Public Service Electric and Gas Co. 76 created a cause of
action for sexual harassment under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 7 7 The
Act was not originally intended to address sexual harassment, 78 and only under
questionable circumstances did it address sex discrimination. 79 Liability under this
cause of action was extended in 1979 with Miller v. Bank of America.80
In the early 1980s, federal courts were influenced by the EEOC guidelines,
although the guidelines have no binding legal authority.8 1 Bundy v. Jackson8 2 and
Henson v. City of Dundee 3 extended and redefined employer liability for sexual
harassment to include cases where no tangible job detriment resulted from the
harassment. 84 Finally, with the Meritor decision, the Supreme Court gave this Title
VII cause of action judicial legitimacy by recognizing its existence. 85
However, creating new law is not the proper function of the courts. 86 The
function of the judiciary is to interpret the laws. Even Judge Skelly Wright, a vocal
advocate of judicial activism, recognizes that, "judicial review is a blunt instrument.
The Court cannot make the subtle, delicate, and in a sense arbitrary distinctions
which the legislature can, and frequently must, make." 8 7 In the regulation of sexual
harassment, the courts have overstepped their constitutional interpretive powers.
Court-created substantive rules are not a new phenomenon, 88 but they are opposed to
the principles of American democratic government as established by the Constitution.
In the American philosophy of government as recorded in the Constitution, the
majoritarian branches of government, the executive and legislative branches, have the
exclusive authority to initiate and enact laws. 89 The judiciary is a passive participant
in the legal process. 90 Therefore, from a constitutional standpoint, the legislature
should be making the types of affirmative decisions that the Court has made in
dealing with sexual harassment. 91
75. 561 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
76. 568 F.2d 1044 (3d Cir. 1977).
77. See infra section II (C).
78. See infra text accompanying note 117.
79. Id.
80. 600 F.2d 211 (9th Cir. 1979).
81. See infra text accompanying note 97.
82. 641 F.2d 934 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
83. 682 F.2d 897 (11th Cir. 1982).
84. Id. at 909.
85. 106 S. Ct. 2399, 2409 (1986).
86. U.S. Co.sr. art. II, § 1; U.S. Co.s'r. art. Ill, § 1; Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,483 (1965); see also
Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955); Giboney v. Empire Storage Co., 336 U.S. 490 (1949); Lincoln
Union v. Northwestern Co., 335 U.S. 525 (1949); Olsen v. Nebraska, 313 U.S. 236 (1941); NVest Coast Hotel Co. v.
Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1936); Tie FEDnmma=s No. 78 (A. Hamilton).
87. Wright, The Role of the Supreme Court in a Democratic Socieo,-Judicial Activism or Restraint?, 54 Comas.
L. REv. 1, 3 (1968).
88. The Supreme Court created a substantive rule in Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), which forced
cross-district school busing in racially segregated school districts.
89. See supra note 86.
90. Wright, supra note 87, at 6.
91. However, federal courts can create law if they do so while interpreting the Constitution. See, e.g., Marbury
v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). In a very small minority of federal eases which have addressed the issue,
courts have found sexual harassment to be behavior which violates the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment. But note that these cases are exclusively limited to situations in which a state is the employer. See Bohen
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Similarly, from a more practical standpoint, the judiciary is not qualified to
make the type of policy it has been making in the sexual harassment area. As
described above, sexual harassment is a complicated and subtle societal issue, 92 and
any decision in a sexual harassment case involves making policy choices. These
choices concern liability, choices about standards of proof, and choices about what
acts constitute sexual harassment. Judges can and must make decisions on these
issues in the absence of legislative guidance. But legislative guidelines are preferable
to a series of piecemeal judicial rules. Due to the case-by-case nature of judicial law,
the judiciary can never address a complicated issue in a comprehensive manner. 93
The aggregated policy choices of many judges deciding many cases in many contexts
cannot be as effective as a well-considered policy made in the legislature after
hearings and debate. Moreover, Congress has the resources to study complex social
issues and the procedural mechanisms to formulate policy on them. The courts have
neither these resources nor these mechanisms. "[T]he Court does not have the
requisite fact-finding machinery and therefore cannot acquire the pertinent knowledge
upon which intelligent social action must be based." 94 For both constitutional and
practical reasons, Congress should be regulating sexual harassment.
2. Administrative Agencies Cannot Create an Adequate Sexual Harassment Law
Administrative agencies also regulate sexual harassment in the workplace. The
1980 sexual harassment guidelines of the EEOC95 have been the most extensive and
influential of these regulations. In Meritor, the Supreme Court recommends that the
guidelines be afforded great deference. 96 However, the Court has also stated that the
EEOC guidelines are properly accorded less weight than many other administrative
regulations because Congress did not give the EEOC power to promulgate rules under
Title VII that have the force of law. 97 Ambiguity concerning the EEOC's authority
causes problems for the courts, who do not have to follow the EEOC's administrative
opinions. Some courts have followed the guidelines, but some have not.98 The
v. City of E. Chicago, 799 F.2d 1180 (7th Cir. 1986); Gobla v. Crestwood School Dist., 609 F. Supp. 972 (M.D. Pa.
1985); Moire v. Temple Univ., 613 F. Supp. 1360 (E.D. Pa. 1985); Scott v. City of Overland Park, 595 F. Supp. 520
(D. Kan. 1984); Skadegaard v. Farrell, 578 F. Supp. 1209 (D.N.J. 1984); Woerner v. Brzeczek, 519 F. Supp. 517 (N.D.
Ill. 1981).
92. Supra section 1I (A)(2).
93. Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 221 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (Holmes comments on the
limitations of judicial action).
94. Wright, supra note 87, at 3.
95. Supra note 66.
96. Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 106 S. Ct. 2399, 2405-06 (1986) ("As an 'administrative interpretation of the
Act by the enforcing agency,' Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433-34, 91 S. Ct. 849, 855, 28 L.Ed. 2d 158
(1971), these guidelines, "'while not controlling upon the courts by reason of their authority, do constitute a body of
experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance,"' General Elec. Co.
v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 141-42, 97 S. Ct. 401, 410-11, 50 L.Ed. 2d 343 (1976), quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co.,
323 U.S. 134, 140, 65 S. Ct. 161, 164, 89 L.Ed. 2d 124 (1944)."); but see Trans Vorld Airlines v. Hardison, 432 U.S.
63, 76 n.ll (1977), in which the Court holds that the guidelines are not entitled to great weight when they are not
supported by legislative history or prior judicial construction.
97. Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, 107 S. Ct. 367, 372 n.6 (1986); General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S.
125, 141 (1976); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 431 (1975); Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134,
139-40 (1944).
98. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977) (specifically rejecting EEOC guidelines
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Supreme Court decided to follow the guidelines in some sections of the Meritor
decision, 99 but did not follow them with regard to the issue of employer liability. °0
In the guidelines, the EEOC suggests strict liability be applied to employers in sexual
harassment cases.10 ' However, the Meritor Court refused to apply that standard,102
and instead suggested placing liability on employers who refuse to take affi-mative
steps to halt sexual harassment or who are unresponsive to harassment complaints.10 3
Further increasing the complexity of the area, the EEOC, as a commission
comprised of short-term presidential appointees, changes its interpretations of its own
guidelines. In Meritor, the brief filed on behalf of the EEOC took a contrary position
to the EEOC guidelines. 10 4 Justice Marshall, in his concurring opinion, notes the
change in positions and finds the most recent assertion "untenable."' ' 05 Even the
current commissioners and staff of the EEOC are in conflict as to the meaning of the
sexual harassment guidelines.10 6
The legal confusion surrounding the EEOC sexual harassment guidelines
demonstrates the need for congressional legislation on the subject. Sexual harassment
is an important topic that effects so much of society that legal confusion in the area
needs to be minimized. Because the EEOC has no mandatory authority, courts and
agencies in many cases can ignore EEOC recommendations, leaving employers and
workers bewildered as to how to react.
3. State Courts and Legislatures Are Not the Best Decision-Makers to Be Creating
Sexual Harassment Law
State courts and legislatures are the third source of sexual harassment regula-
tions. In 1981, twelve states and the District of Columbia had regulations, executive
orders, or guidelines that explicitly prohibited sexual harassment. 0 7 While these
actions are commendable, they cannot replace the need for general federal legislation
on the subject. State governments have tended not to address the issue quickly,
comprehensively, or uniformly, and in many cases they have not addressed it at
on bona fide security systems); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (rejecting EEOC guidelines on employment
selection procedures).
99. Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 106S. Ct. 2399, 2407-08 (1986).
100. Id. at 2408.
101. EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R § 1604.11(c) (1985).
102. Meritor Sav.- Bank v. Vinson, 106 S. Ct. 2399, 2408 (1986).
103. Justice Rehnquist did not issue a definitive rule on employer liability, but he made a clear statement that the
District of Columbia Court of Appeals "erred in concluding that employers are always automatically liable for sexual
harassment by their supervisors." Id. at 2408-09.
104. The government suggested using traditional agency standards when applying liability to employers, instead of
using the strict liability that the EEOC guidelines supported. Brief for the United States and the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commision as Amidi Curiae at 20-30, Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 106 S. Ct. 2399 (1986) (No. 84-1979).
105. Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 106 S. Ct. 2399, 2410 (1986) (Marshall, J., concurring).
106. Commissioner Rosalie Gaull Silberman argued against an interpretation of strict employer liability in sexual
harassment cases in an October, 1985 brief (R. Silberman, EEOC Memorandum Regarding Commission Participation as
Amicus Curiae in PSFS Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 210 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) E-1 (Oct. 30, 1985)), while EEOC
Acting General Counsel Johnny Butler took an opposing stance at a meeting during the same month (J. Butler, EEOC
Memorandum Regarding PSFS Say. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 210 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) E-2 (Oct. 30, 1985)).
107. Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA), News and Background Information (Part II), at 4, July 20, 1981.
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all.108 The same can be said for state courts, which generally address the issue as a
common-law tort, with differing methods and results. 10 9 A federal statute would
assure uniformity, thereby reducing confusion of the laws. Moreover, federal sexual
harassment regulation would affect every employer in the country.1lo Making
employers comply with one set of comprehensive regulations would prove less
confusing and much more efficient than forcing interstate companies to comply with
several different statutes applying differing standards of liability and differing
definitions of the offense. Also, a federal statute would leave no questions in the
minds of employers as to the seriousness of the problem and the commitment of
lawmakers to crafting a solution. However, state courts would still be able to
supplement the federal legislation. 1 '
On-the-job sexual harassment is a widespread national problem that needs a
broad national solution. By regulating discrimination in the workplace through
various civil rights acts, Congress demonstrated that this type of legislation is within
its realm of power and responsibility. Since Congress started regulating sex
discrimination in the workplace, it should finish the job by directly addressing the
current sexual harassment situation.
C. Congress Has Not Yet Explicitly Addressed the Issue of Work-Related Sexual
Harassment
Despite judicial and administrative interpretations to the contrary, the United
States Congress has not yet addressed the issue of sexual harassment as defined in this
Comment. Actions of the EEOC and the Meritor Court incorrectly imply that
Congress dealt with the subject in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. As Justice
Rehnquist notes in Meritor, 12 the prohibition against discrimination based on sex
was added to Title VII at the last minute on the floor of the House of Representa-
tives.11 3 Representative Smith, the sponsor of the amendment to place sex disrimina-
tion under Title VII, was opposed to Title VII, and the amendment was apparently an
108. The only states to enact rules, regulations, or executive orders expressly prohibiting sexual harassment are as
follows: California, sections 7287.6(b)(1) and 7291.1(f)(1)-(2) of Cal. Fair Emp. and Hous. Rules, CAL. Amut.. CODE
tit.2, div. 4 (1980); Colorado, rule 80.11 of the Sex Discrimination Rules adopted by the Colo. Civ. Rights Comm.
(1972); Connecticut, CoNm. GEN. STAT., § 46a-60(8) (1986); District of Columbia, Mayor Barry's Order 79-89 of May 24,
1979; Florida, Exec. Order 81-69 (1981); Illinois, Exec. Order 80-1 (1980); Indiana, Exec. Order 6-82 (1982); Kansas,
Exec. Order 82-55 (1982); Kentucky, section 2, Guidelines on Discrimination as adopted by Ky. Comm. on Human
Rights, codified in 104 Ky. ADOMw. REo. SErvicE Ch.1 (1981); Massachusetts, Exec. Order No. 240 (1984); Michigan,
section 101(h) of the Mich. Civil Rights Act, enacted by P.A. 453 (1976); Minnesota, Minn. Human Rights Act, as
codified in Mim. STAT. § 363.01, subdiv. 10a (1985); Montana, Exec. Order No. 7-82 (1982), and Mo.vr. Ami.i R.
1301-06 (1983); Oregon, Exec. Order 81-7 (1981); Pennsylvania, Penn. Human Rel. Comm., Guidelines on Sexual
Harassment (1981); Rhode Island, Exec. Order No. 80-9 (1980); South Dakota, Exec. Order 81-08 (1981); Wisconsin,
section 111.32, Wis. Fair Empl. Act, as codified in Wis. STAT. § 111, subchap. 11 (1979).
109. Supra note 108.
110. Some small, local employers may escape liability because congressional regulation of the workplace is based
on the commerce clause, with emphasis on employers who deal in interstate commerce.
111. California Fed. Say. and Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 107 S. Ct. 683, 693-94 (1987) (A state civil rights statute is
not preempted by a federal civil rights statute if the two statutes are not inconsistent.).
112. Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 106 S. Ct. 2399, 2404 (1986).
113. "[S]ex was added as prohibited classification in a last minute attempt by opponents to block passage of the
Civil Rights Bill [Titie VII]." Wilson v. Southwest Airlines Co., 517 F. Supp. 292, 297 n.12 (N.D. Tex. 1981).
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attempt to politically weaken the legislation. 1 4 He claimed in his sponsorship speech
that he proposed the amendment because, "I do not think it can do any harm to this
legislation; maybe it can do some good." " 5 Debate on the amendment is sparse, and
most of it centers on what effect the amendment would have on passage of Title VII
as a package."16 As one commentator observed, "[i]n the context of that debate and
of the prevailing congressional sentiment when the amendment was offered, it is
abundantly clear that a principal motive in introducing it was to prevent passage of
the basic legislation being considered by Congress, rather than solicitude for
women's employment rights."1 17
The House engaged in very little debate on the substantive merits or detriments
of outlawing sex discrimination in the workplace. The Senate had no debate on the
subject. Due to the manner and date of the amendment's proposal, no committee
reports or transcripts address the subject. The small amount of legislative history that
does exist shows that Congress did not intend to create a remedy for most of the
situations that now fall under the definition of sexual harassment.ItS In the legislative
history of the amendment, the only activities that are discussed are traditional
discriminatory compensation and hiring and firing practices that are not considered to
be sexual harassment. 119 The House debate does not mention that Title VII was
intended to regulate the personal sexual actions and attitudes of employees-to
penalize employees for courting in the office instead of in health clubs or
discotheques. 120
Because of the traditional courtship aspect of sexual harassment, it is incon-
ceivable to think that such a hastily proposed and politically motivated amendment
would have included hostile work environment sexual harassment, or even quid pro
quo sexual harassment, when nothing relating to either type of act was mentioned.12
Furthermore, Congress was even less likely to intend a sweeping reform of workplace
rules affecting the sexually-oriented relations between employees to be created with
no reference to the problem, especially when "[t]he major concern of Congress at the
time the Act was promulgated was race discrimination.' 1 22 Congress gave no
acknowledgement that this effect was intended or even contemplated.
114. 110 CoNo. REc. 2577 (1964). Representative Green observed that "many of the people who are most ardent
in support of this amendment today were among those who . . . were the strongest in their opposition to a very simple
bill to provide equal pay for equal work for women." Id. at 2584. Representative Smith voted against Title VII on the
day after he successfully proposed the amendment to it. Id. at 2804.
115. Id. at 2577.
116. Id. at 2577-84, 2718-21.
117. Kanowitz, Sex-Based Discrimination in American Law 111: Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and the Equal
Pay Act of 1963, 20 HAsr-os L.J. 305, 311 (1968).
118. 110 CoNo. REc. 2584, 2718-21 (1964).
119. Id. at 2577-84.
120. Id. at 2577-84, 2718-21.
121. "[T]he meager legislative history regarding the addition of "sex" in [Title VII] provides slim guidance for
divining [Clongressional intent.... Without more extensive consideration, Congress in all probability did not intend for
its proscription of sexual discrimination to have significant and sweeping implications." Willingham v. Macon Tel. Publ.
Co., 507 F.2d 1084, 1090 (5th Cir. 1975).
122. Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 566 F.2d 659, 662 (9th Cir. 1977) (citing 1964 U.S. CoDE CoNG. &
ADMN. NEs 2355-2519); see also Kanowitz, supra note 117, at 310 ("Had the sex provisions of Title VII been presented
[in 19641 as a separate bill, rather than being coupled as they were in an effusion of [Clongressional gimmickry with
legislation aimed at curbing racial and ethnic discrimination, their defeat in 1964 would have been virtually assured.").
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While Congress addressed racial, religious, ethnic, and sexual discrimination in
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, it had no intention of addressing the issues
that the Meritor decision and the EEOC guidelines impute into the Act.123 In fact,
Congress has never actually confronted sexual harassment issues. The topic of sexual
harassment has arisen occasionally in congressional committee,12 4 but no legislation
that deals directly with the issue has been discussed.
III. CONGRESS SHOULD TAKE ACTION IN REGULATING SEXuAL HARASSMENT
When Congress finally passes legislation regulating sexual harassment in the
workplace, it must attempt to balance several competing interests. First, it must
condemn sexual harassment without infringing on rights to personal association.
Second, it must compel employers to take affirmative steps to limit harassment
without overburdening the employers with excessive regulations. Finally, it must
provide rules and guidelines for employers, employees, and courts without creating
unmanageable standards.
To achieve these goals, Congress needs to: explicitly create a cause of action
prohibiting sexually harassing acts and speech (including both quid pro quo sexual
harassment and hostile work environment sexual harassment); create liability for
employers who have not taken affirmative action to halt harassment in their
workplaces (allowing both equitable and compensatory damage relief for victims);
and provide for equitable, compensatory, and punitive damage relief from the
employee who committed the harassing act. These recommendations provide the
basis for a strong sexual harassment policy.
A. Congress Should Explicitly Create a Cause of Action for Sexual Harassment
Currently, no explicit federal statutory prohibition of sexual harassment exists.
An explicit congressional prohibition of sexual harassment would solve several
problems. Most importantly, by making the first specific statutory rule regulating
sexual harassment, Congress would be reducing confusion in the law of this area, and
would be making a definitive statement that sexual harassment is unacceptable
conduct that will not be tolerated in the workplace.
123. Since the passage of Title VII in 1964, Congress has made no significant change in the sex discrimination
provisions used by the courts to justify prohibition of sexual harassment. The 1972 Amendments to Title VI in the Equal
Employment Opportunity Act were added to "remedy the economic deprivation of women as a class." Holloway v.
Arthur Andersen & Co., 566 F.2d 659, 662 (9th Cir. 1977). Congress has resisted other attempts to amend the Act in the
area of sex discrimination. For example, several bills were introduced in Congress in the mid-1970s to amend Title VII
so that it prohibits discrimination against "sexual preference," but none has passed. (H.R. 5452, 94th Cong., lst Sess.
(1975); H.R. 166, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); and H.R. 2667, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975)). Seven were presented
to the 95th Congress: H.R. 451, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); H.R. 2998, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); H.R. 4794, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); H.R. 5239, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); H.R. 7775, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); H.R. 8268,
95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); and H.R. 8269, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
124. See, e.g., Examination of Issues Affecting Women in Our Nation's Labor Force, 1981: Hearings Before the
Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 97th Cong., 1st Seass. (1981) (statement by Senator Orrin G. Hatch,
Chairman).
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The cause of action that Congress creates should include liability for both quid
pro quo sexual harassment and hostile work environment sexual harassment. 125 Both
forms of sexual harassment are currently actionable under Title VII,126 and
proscribing them would be consistent with related law. More importantly, both
recognized forms of sexual harassment are offensive and degrading actions that
deserve condemnation. 27
Quid pro quo sexual harassment is a form of sexual imposition that should be
restricted even if it would not be considered discriminatory. It is a tortious act,
comparable to rape, with a victim who is forced to submit sexually to a more
powerful person or face negative consequences for resisting the attack. Catherine
MacKinnon observes that like rape, "[w]ith [quid pro quo] sexual harassment,
rejection [of a sexual advance] proves that the advance is unwanted but also is likely
to call forth retaliation, thus forcing the victim to bring intensified injury upon herself
in order to demonstrate that she is injured at all." 128 Often quid pro quo sex
discrimination is more subtle than rape, 129 but not always. 130
The case of Munford v. James T. Barnes & Co. 13 1 is a typical example of the
ramifications of quid pro quo harassment. Plaintiff was repeatedly propositioned by
her supervisor, and she always refused the propositions. 132 When she refused to
accompany her supervisor on a business trip, in which she was expected to share a
hotel room and have sexual relations with him, she was discharged from her job. 133
Thus, quid pro quo sexual harassment creates a no win situation for the victim.
Conversely, hostile environment sexual harassment frequently creates no
measurable harm. However, a harm still exists in hostile environment cases. Federal
courts have recognized a cause of action for this harm in racial, religious, and ethnic
discrimination cases. 134 More recently, the court-created cause of action has been
125. These two catagories of sexual harassment are not necessarily a natural separation. "On a practical level, of
course, there are many cases that could be characterized interchangeably as condition of work or quidpro quo cases. See,
e.g., Tomkins v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 568 F.2d 1044, 1046 & n. 1 (3d Cir. 1977)." Henson v. City of Dundee,
682 F.2d 897, 908 n. 18 (Ith Cir. 1982). The Federal District Court for Alaska agrees:
The distinction between "tangible job benefit" ("quid pro quo") cases and "hostile work environment" cases
is often discussed by courts, hut this court finds it an extremely slippery concept. The situations which are dealt
with in sex discrimination cases present a factual and legal continuum. There is no square peg that fits into a
square hole nor a round peg for a round hole. Rather, there is a seemingly endless variety of sex discrimination
cases with one situation blending into another when comparisons are made.
Jeppsen v. Wunnicke, 611 F. Supp. 78, 83 (D. Alaska 1985) (citations omitted).
126. Hostile environment sexual harassment was confirmed as acause of action under Title VIi in Mentor Sav. Bank
v. Vinson, 106 S. Ct. 2399, 2409 (1986); quidpro quo was held actionable in Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir.
1977).
127. See infra notes 128-40 and accompanying text.
128. C. MNfcKr,;soN, supra note 1, at 46.
129. Id. at 32-40. One woman was told by her supervisor that "she would be better served if she 'linked both her
professional work and her personal life to his own needs.'" Id. at 34.
130. Id. at 32.
131. 441 F. Supp. 459 (E.D. Mich. 1977).
132. Id. at 460-62.
133. Id.
134. Cariddi v. Kansas City Chiefs Football Club, 568 F.2d 87, 88 (8th Cir. 1977) (national origin); Firefighters
Inst. for Racial Equality v. St. Louis, 549 F.2d 506 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 819 (1977) (race); Gray v.
Greyhound Lines, East, 545 F.2d 169 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (race); Compston v. Borden, Inc., 424 F. Supp. 157 (S.D. Ohio
1976) (religion).
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extended to sexual discrimination.t 35 The Eleventh Circuit described the harm caused
by hostile environment sexual harassment:
Sexual harassment which creates a hostile or offensive environment for members of one sex
is every bit the arbitrary barrier to sexual equality at the workplace that racial harassment is
to racial equality. Surely, a requirement that a man or woman run a gauntlet of sexual abuse
in return for the privilege of being allowed to work and make a living can be as demeaning
and disconcerting as the harshest of racial epithets. 36
The Bundy v. Jackson 37 case illustrates this problem. The plaintiff, Bundy, was
never threatened with loss of employment benefits. However, she was subjected to
lewd remarks and sexual propositions from her superior.138 When she complained to
a higher supervisor, he told her that "any man in his right mind would want to rape
you,"1 39 and then he propositioned her.140 Bundy suffered no measurable economic
harm, but she was harmed nonetheless. She was degraded and abused by men with
power over her employment. Any statutory cause of action for sexual harassment
should provide liability for all harassment, regardless of whether or not the harm
caused by the harassing behavior is tangible.
B. Congress Should Force Employers to Take Affirmative Steps to Fight Sexual
Harassment
In establishing a cause of action for sexual harassment, Congress should assign
liability to employers who do not take affirmative steps to stop sexual harassment in
their workplaces. Doing so would force employers to address the issue of sexual
harassment in a positive mariner while avoiding many of the inequities that strict
liability can bring.' 4 1 The type of employer liability rule recommended in this
Comment was described by the United States and the EEOC in their Amici Curiae
brief to the Supreme Court in Meritor. They called for "a rule that asks whether a
victim of sexual harassment had reasonably available an avenue of complaint
135. Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
136. Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 902 (1lth Cir. 1982).
137. 641 F.2d 934 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
138. Id. at 940.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Burdening employers under a standard of strict liability is overly harsh, and the policy goals derived from such
action can be attained through the more reasonable methods suggested in this section. Strict liability for supervisor
harassment would effectively force the employer to pay for all sexually-oriented words or actions that an employee finds
offensive, regardless of whether the employer had taken affirmative steps to eliminate all such conduct, and regardless
of whether the employer could have known about the action. Also, at least in hostile environment cases, the liability would
usually be imposed on an employer for behavior outside the scope of its supervisor's authority. ("lWlhen supervisory
personnel engage in such activity, they act outside the scope of their authority ... " Ferguson v. E.I. duPont de Nemours
and Co., 560 F. Supp. 1172, 1199 (D. Del. 1983).).
Strict liability would put employers in "a virtually indefensible legal posture." Conte and Gregory, Sexual
Harassment in Employment-Some Proposals Toward More Realistic Standards of Liability, 32 DRAEs L. RPv. 407, 410
(1982-83). If an employer takes affirmative action to prohibit sexual harassment at his workplace--anti-harassment policy
statements, a well-publicized and confidential grievance procedure, and strict, well-enforced penalties for harassing
supervisors-he should not be made to pay for an action which he never had the opportunity to redress by established
company procedures. See Ferguson v. E.I. duPont de Nemours and Co., 560 F. Supp. 1172, 1199 (D. Del. 1983). Strict
liability leaves too much room for abuse of the law by dissatisfied or vengeful employees.
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regarding such harassment, and, if available and utilized, whether that procedure was
reasonably responsive to the employee's complaint." 142
Under such a rule, an employer would be liable for the sexual harassment of a
supervisory employee if the employer knew about the harassment and took no steps
or took inadequate steps to remedy the situation. The employer would also be liable
if the victim employee had no practical method of notifying the employer of the
harassment. Thus, to be safe with regard to liability in sexual harassment cases,
employers would have to put in place a reasonable complaint procedure and actively
encourage its use. The policy would have the effect of alerting employees to the
seriousness of sexual harassment and opening channels of communication to provide
relief. Furthermore, under the proposed rule, "if an employer had an express policy
against sexual harassment and has implemented a procedure specifically designed to
resolve sexual harassment claims, and if the victim does not take advantage of the
procedure," then the employer would be sheltered from liability. 143 This avoids
trapping conscientious employers by holding them liable without allowing them an
opportunity to provide a remedy for the act of harassment.
When an employer is held liable, both equitable and compensatory relief should
be allowed to the plaintiff. This affords judges complete freedom to provide whatever
remedy seems reasonable under the circumstances.
C. Congress Should Create a Federal Cause of Action Against the Harassing
Employee
Currently, the only personal causes of action against a harassing individual are
state court tort claims. 1 44 However, the individual who actually commits the violation
should be held responsible for that action. Assignment of personal liability to any
supervisory employee who sexually harasses a nonsupervisory employee, and
holding the harassing employee responsible for equitable, compensatory, and
punitive relief would prove most effective. Allowing such penalties strikes at the
heart of sexual harassment by forcing employees to be personally accountable for
their own actions in the workplace. The severity of the penalties serves as a
punishment for socially unacceptable behavior and a warning to other employees.
IV. CONCLUSION
Congress should prohibit and regulate sexual harassment through the passage of
new legislation. Many working Americans at some time will be affected by sexual
harassment. Some individuals need help in fighting harassment, while others need to
142. Mentor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 106 S. Ct. 2399, 2407-08 (1986) (citing Brief for United States and Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission as Amici Curiae at 26, Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 106 S. Ct. 2399 (1986) (No.
84-1979)).
143. Id.
144. E.g., Howard Univ. v. Best, 484 A.2d 958 (D.C. 1984) (intentional infliction of emotional distress, plaintiff
awarded compensatory damages); Phillips v. Smalley Maintenance Serv., 435 So. 2d 705 (Ala. 1983) (intrusion, plaintiff
awarded compensatory damages); Skousen v. Nidy, 90 Ariz. 215, 367 P.2d 248 (1961) (assult and battery, plaintiff
awarded both compensatory and punitive damages). See generally Schoenheider, A Theory of Tort Liability for Sexual
Harassment in the Workplace, 134 U. PA. L. REv. 1461 (1986).
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know what to do to avoid liability. The problem will not diminish, and the
noncongressional attempts to address it have left the law in a state of disorder. Only
through federal legislative initiative can order be restored to the workplace.
Sexual harassment, because of its complexity and its relatively recent develop-
ment as a legal issue, is a fertile field for additional scholarly attention. Several of the
topics mentioned herein deserve further cultivation. This Comment only provides an
overview of sexual harassment theory, and just glances at the many issues which must
be addressed if the law is to grow in a sensible manner. The law prohibiting sexual
harassment in the workplace will continue to grow, but it should grow to reflect a
well-considered congressional policy and not a confused fusion of judicial, admin-
istrative, and state decisions.
Theodore F. Claypoole
